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I. Introduction 
 
The Middle East and North Africa (henceforth MENA) are 
areas of conflict and opposed perceptions. The last three months 
have seen unprecedented protests and revolutions in almost all 
Arab countries (“Arab Spring”), starting in Tunisia with the flight 
of Ben Ali and his family, spreading to Egypt with the overthrow 
of Mubarak and his government, and to Libya with its civil war 
and most recently to Syria. 
 
Some of the demonstrators’ criticisms and demands were the 
same across the region, namely end to corruption, fall of the 
regime, freedom, creation of employment opportunities, while 
others were country-specific. The demonstrations of hundreds of 
thousands of participants, who often occupied the capital’s main 
square, started peacefully but often turned violent, when the 
demonstrators clashed with security forces.  
 
The challenged regimes responded with a combination of 
suppression, including intimidation, beatings, shootings, arrests, 
and concessions, amongst which increasing salaries for state 
employees, raising of subsidies for staples and promises of reform. 
With thousands of demonstrators killed, thousands more 
imprisoned, some regimes toppled and others still in power, some 
even unchallenged, but with demonstrations ongoing and the set-
up of new governments only just under way, it is hard to predict 
the future of the region.  
 
This paper aims to examine the role of Turkey in the MENA 
region. Herewith, we will attempt to answer three basic questions: 
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What role can Turkey play in the MENA Region? What can the 
aspiring democracies of the Arab world learn from Turkey? How 
relevant is the Turkish experience to the future of democracy in 
the Arab World? 
 
 
II. Relations of Turkey with the Middle East: A Brief 
Historical Overview 
 
The relations between Turkey and the MENA countries, since 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, can be 
characterised as having been full of misconceptions, 
contradictions, suspicions and failures on both sides. This was the 
case even though Turkey and the Arab countries had a long and 
often shared history. The mutual distrust and suspicion of Arabs 
and Turks is the outcome of recent history only. Even though 
Turkey had cultural, religious and historical ties with most of the 
Middle Eastern territories throughout Ottoman times, Ankara 
followed a politically and culturally different path from that of 
most Middle Eastern countries, after the collapse of the Empire. 
 
All Turkish governments between 1923 and 2002 gave priority 
to Western partners over the Middle East in their international 
relations. The reason for this was that Turkey's “new republican 
elites” regarded themselves as European, or as part of the Western 
world, and not as Middle Eastern. They therefore identified 
themselves with western political, economic and security 
institutions such as NATO, the OECD and more recently the EU. 
Consequently, Turkey took a different path from that of most 
Middle Eastern states.  
 
In this respect, Philip Robins suggests that “Ankara's main 
features are strict adherence to the principles of non-interference 
and non-involvement in the domestic politics and interstate 
conflicts of all countries in the region”.1 Consequently, it aimed at 
                                                          
1  Robins, Phillips, 1991: Turkey and the Middle East (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs/Pinter Publishers): 8. 
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improving its bilateral political and commercial relations with as 
many states in the region as possible. Furthermore, Ankara tried to 
maintain a scrupulous balance in its approach to the Israel-
Palestine conflict. However, it has not been possible for Turkey to 
ignore regional disputes and to remain outside regional affairs, 
since the Second World War. 
 
 
III. Why has Turkey kept its distance from the Middle East? 
 
The young Turkish Republic was based on three main pillars: 
independence, Western (or European) orientation, and the goal of 
catching up with the advanced economies of Europe. Besides 
security and economic reasons, which drew Turkey to the Western 
world, there were two fundamental and supplementary push 
factors, which have dominated relations between Turkey and the 
MENA since the foundation of the Republic: 
 
i. The belief that Islam hinders modernisation. The 
secularist principle was used as a tool for the elimination of 
Islamic influences on politics and society, and it was considered as 
a pre-condition for acquiring a European identity. Turks and Arabs 
had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for centuries; they had 
been part of the same state and shared the same religion, Islam. In 
order to dissociate itself from Islam and the Arab world, which so 
powerfully symbolised it, the caliphate was abolished in 1924. 
Thus, secularism became one of the cornerstones of the young 
Turkish Republic. It was not always easy to maintain the strict 
separation of religious and state affairs in a country in which 99 
percent of the population is Muslim. Supporters of the Republican 
movement and the pro-Western elite strongly believed, and do so 
to this day, that Turkey can only catch up with Western 
civilisation if the country continues to reject basing the state on 
Islamic principles. For all these reasons, it seemed to be necessary 
for the elite to freeze its ties with the newly emerging Arab and 
other Islamic countries. 
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ii. Their experience with its Arab provinces during World 
War I and Turkey’s recent historical and contemporary experience 
with the Middle East has been a negative one. Even ninety years 
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, mutual suspicions -
largely unfounded- persist. The founders of the Republic, who 
fought against the Allies in different parts of the Empire during the 
First World War, did not forget what they consider as the Arab 
"betrayal", namely the appeal to the British to help them to gain 
their independence. Ataturk once said: 
  
" ... for centuries our people have been compelled 
to act in accordance with this absurd point of view 
in solidarity with the Islamic part of the Ottoman 
Empire and what happened? Millions of them died, 
in every land they went to. Do you know how many 
Anatolian boys perished in the sweltering heat of 
the deserts of the Yemen? "2 
 
These deep-rooted psychological and historical barriers were 
constantly reinforced in the public mind, and thus previous 
Turkish governments did not pursue an activist policy in the 
region. In addition to the two reasons given above, the following 
cultural, historical and social factors could also have played an 
important role in Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern 
countries, or lack thereof, which have greatly hindered the 
intensification of relations between Turkey and the rest of the 
Middle East. 
  
Although historically, both Damascus and Baghdad have been 
the capitals of Arab empires in the 7th and (with interruptions) the 
8th to the 13th century, the Ottoman Empire dominated the region 
in the following centuries. For several centuries, a large part of the 
region was governed politically and economically by the 
                                                          
2 Hale, William, 1992: “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis”, in: 
International Affairs, 68,4: 679-692: 681. 
Another interesting and similar observations concerning Ottoman-Arab relations 
during the last period of the Ottoman Empire was made in the book "Zeytindağı" 
by Falih Rıfkı Atay, 1932, and republished by Bateş A.Ş. Istanbul, 1981. 
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Ottomans. Some Arab countries seem not to have forgotten the 
centuries of Ottoman rule and, perhaps, the harsh repression that 
followed the emergence of their national movements. Some Arabs 
still suspect Ankara of following "Ottoman ambitions". 
 
Since the Independence War (1919-1922) and the 
establishment of a Turkish nation state in 1923, Turkey has not 
been involved in any military conflict with the powerful states of 
the Western world. However, this was not the case for most of the 
Middle Eastern countries. Most Arab states continued to suffer 
under colonialism and imperialism until well after the First World 
War. Turkey's neighbours Syria, Iraq and Iran were, in their recent 
histories, controlled by Western powers. Following World War I, 
Great Britain and France held the League of Nations mandate for 
Iraq and Syria. Iran was unofficially under the rule of Britain and, 
from the early 1950s until the Islamic revolution, was under the 
influence of the United States. Western armed forces entered the 
region many times, whereas Turkey was able to keep itself out of 
regional conflicts in which Arabs played a part. 
 
It was obvious that an asymmetry of interests existed in the 
security realm between Arab countries and Turkey. During the last 
years of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic, the country was threatened by the expansionist policy of 
both Tsarist Russia and then later the Soviet Union. This was one 
of the main reasons which led to Turkey joining NATO in 1952. 
By contrast, the Soviet Union has never directly threatened the 
Arab world the way it did Turkey; actual military danger 
originated consistently and solely with Western powers. Arabs 
regarded Ankara, in its relation with the West, as advocating the 
political and economic interests of the Western powers in the 
region and accused it of acting as America's policeman in the 
Middle East.   
 
Another point of dissent between Turkey and the Arab world 
was the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, which came 
about with the help of Western powers. The neighbouring Arab 
countries regarded this as a direct threat. The post-war period of 
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the Middle East was largely characterised by armed conflicts 
between Israel and the Arab countries, during which time the 
Palestinians lost their homeland and Israel’s neighbour’s part of 
their territory. During these years, Ankara tried to maintain its 
friendly relations with Israel, based on their mutual interests since 
1949, when Turkey, as one of the first Muslim countries, officially 
recognised Israel. Turkey does not have an easy relationship with 
its Arab neighbours. It has been pursuing a policy of duality for 
several years, both recognising Israel's right to exist within its 
national boundaries and supporting the cause of a Palestinian state.  
 
In 1964, however, Turkey began revising its policies towards 
the Arab world and favoured it for two main reasons:  
 
Its traditional Western allies, mainly the US, did not support 
Turkey over the "Cyprus issue" in the 1960s. Ankara, therefore, 
sought backing from the Arab and Muslim countries in the UN. 
Meanwhile, the Arab world and non-aligned countries gave 
Turkey the cold shoulder because of its diplomatic recognition of 
their main enemy, Israel, and because of its lack of interest in the 
non-aligned members of the world community. Ankara must have 
seen that its "one-way" foreign policy, which it had pursued for 
over two decades, and its dogged loyalty to the USA and the 
Western camp did not help it pursue its national interests. Its rigid 
adherence to a pro-Western foreign policy led the country into 
total isolation in the region. Consequently, Ankara began to 
diversify its foreign policy and to pay more attention to the Middle 
East. 
 
Secondly, following the first and second oil shock in 1973/74 
and in 1979, the Turkish economy faced very serious 
macroeconomic imbalances and was not able to adjust itself to the 
new economic circumstances. Thus, both the trade deficit and the 
inflation rate rose rapidly. Ankara became aware of the 
seriousness of the situation and tried to take advantage of the new 
recycling of petro-dollars, offered by the OPEC-Arab states, and 
the "Euro-Dollar Market".  
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Turkey's Middle Eastern policies during the Cold War and 
thereafter were mainly determined by the following factors: 
territorial disputes with Syria over the province “Hatay” and the 
Baghdad Pact; the Cyprus dispute and PLO policy; economic 
problems and the financial needs of Turkey resulting from the first 
and second oil crises (1973/74 and 1979); the Israeli - Arab 
conflict on the Palestine dispute; the water issue; PKK terrorism; 
the Gulf war in 1991; and the Iraq war in 2003.3  
 
 
IV. What are the main economic and political problems in 
the MENA countries? 
 
MENA countries, besides Israel and Turkey, can be divided 
into two groups. On the one hand, there are the resource-poor 
authoritarian states of non-oil producing countries, with lower 
income and insufficient economic and social living conditions 
(lower per capita income, life expectancy at birth and adult 
literacy), such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and 
Jordan.  
 
The second group covers the rich OPEC countries, with 
relatively higher per capita income and better economic and social 
infrastructure, such as the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, 
Algeria and Iran. In the second group of countries, the oil and 
natural gas revenues have benefited the population and improved 
its living standards. They have tax allowances and paid for social 
benefits and health services offered by the states.  
 
Besides the differences in economic conditions, a shared 
characteristic of both groups is authoritarian regimes. The second 
important feature is that the populations of all these countries, 
besides Israel, share the same faith, “Islam”, and none of them 
                                                          
3 For a detailed analysis on Turkey’s Middle East Policy see Benli-Altunisik, 
Meliha, 2011a: “Challenges to Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ in the Middle East”, in: 
Turkey and the Middle East Series. Turkish Economy and Social Studies 
Foundation (TESEV): 14-17. 
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practice the principles of secularism in a basic meaning. 
Everybody has the right to his own belief, and state and religious 
affairs should be separated from each other in their daily life. 
Religion is regarded as an integral part of private life, and 
religious affairs are not admitted in the public sphere. Religious 
communities are allowed to operate under public law and public 
order.  
 
According to the Report published by the European 
Commission on the theme of Euro-Med 2030: Long Term 
challenges for the Mediterranean area, the following economic 
and social problems need to be addressed:4  
 
i. Rapid population growth and the high level of structural 
unemployment.  
 
55 million new jobs are required until 2030. A higher growth 
rate will be essential and it is not expected that macro economic 
growth will create enough jobs or greatly reverse social 
deprivation. Large sections of the population are excluded from 
the benefits of growth. The rural population is large and on the 
increase, while poverty is still widespread.  
 
ii. Scarcity of natural resources such as water and the impact 
of climate change.  
 
There are important resource constraints that operate on both 
sides of the Mediterranean. The shortage of water is a serious 
concern on both shores and is likely to get worse as a consequence 
of climate change; the impact of water shortage on agriculture and 
rural communities will be dramatic. The Mediterranean basin will 
be among the worst affected regions in the world as a consequence 
of climate change.  
 
                                                          
4 European Commission, 2011: Euro-Med 2030. Report of an Expert Group 
(Brussels: European Commission):11-25. 
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iii. Education. 
  
Improving the educational system and rising levels of 
education is a huge challenge. In spite of real progress, much 
remains to be done to adapt the education systems of MENA 
countries to the requirements of more developed countries. Public 
expenditure on education in the region has been less effective than 
elsewhere in the world.  
 
iv. Authoritarian regimes may persist. 
  
If they do, there will not be change, because that would bring 
about uncertainty and thereby threaten the regimes’ continuity.  
Authoritarian states in Arab countries have little desire to seek 
Islamic models of pluralist politics.  
 
Furthermore, the empirical research results show serious 
institutional deficiencies in terms of government effectiveness, 
control of corruption, as well as political rights and civil liberties, 
which continue to constrain future growth in many Arab 
countries.5 
 
It is obvious that all these tensions induced and contributed to 
the revolutions in Turkey’s near abroad. The revolt against the 
ruling classes in some of the MENA countries is closely related to 
socio-economic factors. The lack of future economic development 
perspectives and a very high unemployment rate among young 
people, the lack of educational opportunities, and democratic 
deficiencies are main sources of unrest, especially in poorer 
countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Nunnenkamp, Peter, 2003: “Economic Policy, Institutional Development and 
Income Growth: how Arab Countries Compare with Other Developing 
countries”, Kiel Working Paper 118, Institute for the World Economy, Kiel: 31. 
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V. Turkey as a model for the transformation process in the 
region 
 
One might think that Turkey, as a successor state to the 
Ottoman Empire, which ruled parts of in the Middle East for over 
400 years, could not use its wealth of experience in political, 
economical, and cultural affairs in the contemporary context, 
without coming across as arrogant and reminding people of 
unpleasant events. But Ankara could indeed help Middle Eastern 
states find their identities and cooperate with them, particularly in 
the economic field and in conflict resolution, without giving up its 
ambitious aim of becoming part of Europe.  
 
It is a fact that Turkey has gradually been moving closer to the 
Middle East since 2007. Turkish-EU relations, on the other hand, 
are markedly cooling, as all present economic and political 
indicators show. Due to the EU’s indecisive policy towards 
Turkey’s accession, the attention of Turkey’s foreign policy 
moves from the West via Russia to the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
 
In order to explain the role of Turkey in the MENA region, it is 
important to understand the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy from 
the West to the East since 2007. In other words, what are the 
reasons for the fundamental changes in Turkey’s foreign policy, 
which had been consistent from the foundation of the Republic in 
1923 until 2002?  
 
Following Ahmet Davutoğlu’s appointment as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the relations between Turkey and the MENA 
countries remarkably intensified. In his book Strategic Depth, 
Davutoğlu identifies the “three most important geopolitical areas 
of influence” as follows: (1) “near land basins”, namely the 
Balkans, the Middle East and the Caspian; (2) “near maritime 
basins”, the Black Sea, The Adriatic, the Eastern Mediterranean, 
the Red Sea, the Gulf and the Caspian Sea; (3) “near continents”, 
namely Europe, North Africa, South Asia, Central Asia and East 
Asia. The Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus constitute 
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three zones of interactions. Turkey which is located on the 
Anatolia-Balkan axis can only be a real power if it controls the 
surrounding sea and water ways.6 
 
According to Davutoğlu, Ankara must not only solve bilateral 
problems and conflicts with its neighbouring countries, but also 
between countries, in order to become a soft power in the region. 
It would act as a mediator making “zero problems with 
neighbouring countries” its motto. As a second step, Ankara 
would create a sort of “free trade area without visa restrictions”, 
that allows for the free movement of goods and services by 
intensifying its economic and diplomatic relations with the three 
regions.  
 
Ankara thereby hopes to achieve two aims. First, it seeks to 
realise regional economic integration and to create a zone of peace 
and prosperity under the leadership of Turkey. Secondly, it wants 
to increase its bargaining power in the negotiations process for EU 
membership, and balance the EU by upgrading its strategic 
position.  
 
It is a well-known fact that one of the main arguments for 
Turkey’s membership in the EU is, that through Turkey the EU 
can become a global political power. Turkey already has 
indisputable geo-strategic importance which would help Brussels 
establish a political and economic bond. It would bring strategic 
advantages, not only for the Middle East and Eastern 
Mediterranean region, but also for Russia, the South Caucasus, 
and Central Asia.  
 
As far as economic relations are concerned, Turkey has been 
improving its economic relations remarkably since 2002. MENA 
countries accounted for 17% of Turkey’s international trade, 
which was $300 billion in 2010. Since the 2000s, Turkish 
investment in the neighbouring countries increased rapidly. 
                                                          
6 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2001: Stratejik Derinlik (Istanbul: Kure Publications): 151-
152. 
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Turkey has now established close ties with many neighbouring 
countries by helping in their infrastructure of airports, roads and 
housing. Interestingly, however, the share of foreign investments 
of MENA countries in Turkey was only 7.4% in 2010.7 Due to 
free-entry visa policy agreements with the countries in the region, 
the free movement of persons and tourists has intensified greatly.8 
Turkey’s main competitors in the region are China, the EU and 
Indian companies. 
 
As long as the present AKP remains in power, the economic 
and political relation between Turkey and the Middle East/Eastern 
Mediterranean region will intensify. The AKP was born from an 
existing pro-Islamic oriented party, and its leadership has been 
closely associated with movements in political Islam from its 
inception.9 One of the reasons is the present government’s shared 
faith and cultural heritage with the Middle East. The familiar 
social and political environment brings about a greater ease or 
confidence, and is more comforting than facing unpleasant and 
arrogant European attitudes.  
 
The shifting of Turkey’s interest from the West to the East has 
been described by some commentators as “Neo-Ottomanism”, in 
the sense that Turkey aims to re-establish the dead and buried 
Ottoman Empire.10 However, the term ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ is 
                                                          
7 Kirişci, Kemal, 2011: “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation 
of the Middle East”, in: Insight Turkey, 13,2: 33-55: 37-39. 
8 State Planning Organisation (DPT), 2011:  Foreign Investments in Main 
Economic Indicators. Available at: www.dpt.gov.tr. 
9 “The Rise of the AKP which tempered the anti-Islamic secularism and Anti-
Arab Westernism of the Turkis and rebuilt Turkey’s links to its regional and 
Muslim past[…]Turkey’s stand against American use of its bases in the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and Turkey’s stand against Israel after The Gaza Flotilla incident 
in May of 2010”. See, Salem, Paul, 2011: Turkey’s image in the Arab Word, 
Turkish Economy and Social Studies Foundation (Istanbul: TESEV): 1. 
10 Ömer Tașpinar describes the Neo-Ottomanism as follows: “[…]Three factors 
help define the Neo-Ottoman tendencies of the AKP. The first is the willingness 
to come to terms with Turkey’s Ottoman heritage at home and abroad. The 
second characteristic of Neo-Ottomanism is a sense of grandeur and self-
confidence in foreign policy. Neo-Ottomanism sees Turkey as a regional 
superpower. Its strategic vision and culture. reflects the geographic reach of the 
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misleading for two reasons. First, the term Neo-Ottomanism has a 
negative dimension. Some Turkish commentators overlook this 
dimension, unlike Eliot A. Cohen: “[t]o be an empire … is to be 
envied, resented, suspected, mistrusted, and, often enough, hated” 
by others.11 People in the countries ruled by the Ottomans will 
easily remember this. Undoubtedly, this would have a negative 
impact on the relations between countries of the region and 
Turkey, rather than improve them.  
 
Secondly, it would be difficult to re-establish anything 
resembling the multi-cultural and multi-religious Ottoman Empire 
stretching from the Adriatic Sea to Yemen, because Turkey’s 
demography, legal system and legitimisation are very different. 
The Ottoman Empire’s legal system was based on the Sharia and 
represented by a powerful religious class of priests (ulema), who 
became civil servants of the State in the Republic. From 1774 
onwards, the Ottoman sultans exercised the function of head of the 
Empire and leader of the Muslim community (caliphate). The 
Turkish Republic abolished both Caliphate and Sultanate in the 
1920s. Neo-Ottomanism would thus require the establishment of a 
religiously-legitimised government.  
 
In conclusion, the Ottoman Empire is remembered as a great 
empire comparable to the Roman and British ones that both ruled 
parts of the Middle East. The positive and negative experiences of 
Ottoman times should help Turkey overcome its internal and 
external problems and build genuine cooperation, progress and 
prosperity by working side by side with its neighbours and allies, 
                                                                                                                      
Ottoman and Byzantine Empires. The third aspect of Neo-Ottomanism is its goal 
of embracing the West as much as the Islamic world. Like the imperial city of 
Istanbul, which straddles Europe and Asia, Neo-Ottomanism is Janus-faced. In 
that sense, the fact that the Ottoman Empire was part of Europe matters a great 
deal to AKP’s neo-Ottoman vision.”; See Tașpinar, Ömer, 2011: “The Three 
Strategic Visions of Turkey”, US-Europe Analysis Series 50 (March), Center on 
the United States and Europe at Brookings: 1-2. 
11 Cohen, Eliot A., 2004: “History and the Hyper power”, in: Foreign Affairs, 
83,4. 
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for an enduring peace in the region. But in fact, it is dead and 
buried forever.12 
 
 
VI. How relevant is the Turkish experience for future 
democracy in the Arab World? 
 
Turkey’s role and its possible contribution to the 
democratisation process of the revolted Arab countries has been 
greatly debated recently, and this not only in Turkey, but also by 
Western think-tanks and the media. A number of other factors 
should make Turkey an attractive model for the Arab world. As a 
Muslim country with a secular state in a democratic system and a 
market economy, it offers a credible alternative and a 
counterweight to pro-Islamic movements and fundamentalism. 
However, not only the Arab states, but also Iran fears the loss of 
ground because democratic movements and secularism challenge 
and de-stabilise their, to some extent, autocratic political and non-
competitive, underdeveloped economic systems. 
 
But Turkey’s neighbourhood policy also faces some risks and 
complications. We have to keep in mind that Turkey is an integral 
part of the Middle East and that Iran, Iraq and Syria have common 
borders with Turkey. This raises the possibility of boundary 
disputes and involvement in all kinds of conflict between these 
four countries. In contrast to Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have 
suffered under authoritarian rule during the last few decades.  
 
Thus, it is quite possible that policy-makers of all three 
countries will divert their populations’ attention from domestic 
difficulties to outside events, by creating a potential enemy. In the 
event of unrest in the surrounding Muslim countries (as has taken 
place in Iraq during the Gulf War and in Syria presently), 
uncontrollable masses of refugees, as well as terrorism, could 
                                                          
12 Somel, Akşin, 2011: “Von Türk-Pop und Osmanen-Pomp: Die neue Sicht der 
Türkei auf ihre imperiale Vergangenheit”, Zenith, 01/2011:1. 
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cross the border and create chaotic situations in Turkey. This 
would consequently have a negative effect on Turkey’s political 
and economic stability. 
 
From my point of view it is also questionable whether Turkey 
can act as a role model. As pointed out in various editions of the 
“Progress Report on Turkey”, which the European Commission 
has been publishing since 1999, Turkey still has huge economic 
and democratic deficits.13 When looking at the Turkish experience 
of the democratisation process which started in the 19th century, it 
is clear that it requires patience and perseverance. The greatest 
difficulty consists in getting society to a point where it internalises 
freedoms and human rights. A further requirement is the 
establishment and smooth running of political institutions.  
 
In the case of Turkey, most of the institutional reforms were 
implemented with the help of external actors, as recently by the EU. 
The creation and reform of present institutions were undertaken 
according to the blueprint approach14 with “more haste and less 
speed”. Turkey adopted all political and economic institutions,15 the 
                                                          
13 Global rankings show that the country is seriously underperforming in a wide 
range of areas. It stands 67th in the Economic Freedom Index 2010, 58th in 
Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Index, 83rd in the latest UN 
Human Development Index, 138th in the Reporters Without Borders 2010 Press 
Freedom Index and 123rd in the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index. It 
is listed as only “partially free” in Freedom House’s 2008 Freedom in the World 
Report, and as a “hybrid” regime, ranking 88th, in the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s first-ever survey of democracies (2007). See Schmidt, Laura; Dehnert, Jörg, 
2011: “Die neue Rolle der Türkei angesichts der jüngsten Entwicklungen in der 
Arabischen Welt“, Paper 6/2011, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung: 9-11. 
14 The definition of the blue print approach is “largely top-down, relying on 
expertise on the part of technocrats and foreign advisers”. See Rodrik, Dani, 
2008: One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalisation, Institutions, and Economic 
Growth (Princeton University Press):166. 
15 We define the political power as a set of politicians, political parties and 
represented by free elected governments. Definition of political and economic 
institutions. Acemoğlu, Daron, 2005: “Political Economy of Development and 
Underdevelopment- What are institutions”, Gaston Eyskens Lectures, Leuven, 10 
October. Acemoğlu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James, 2005: 
“Understanding Institutions”, Lionel Robbins Lectures, LSE, 23-25 February. 
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rule of law, and accepted fundamental principles of Western type 
democracy. But Turkey’s political power did not allow it to improve 
the quality of these institutions because they were not fully 
respected.16 The basic problem seems to be the unwillingness, 
weakness and operational inability of political powers, to restructure 
the state apparatus from the bottom up over time, under changing 
national and international circumstances. Knowing what is the right 
policy is not enough; it is also necessary to have both the political 
will and the power to implement it. 
 
Another important difference between Turkey and other 
Islamic countries is the secular basis of its state, which is one of 
the fundamental pillars of the Republic and a great achievement of 
an Islamic country. Turkey adopted the so-called French 
integrationist model, which is based on the separation of state and 
religion. According to this model, religion is considered part of 
private life and religious affairs are not admitted in the public 
sphere, while religious communities must operate under public 
law.  
 
Among a series of secular/Europeanisation measures put into 
force was that the weekend holiday was moved from the Islamic 
holy day to the Christian Sunday, which is the Christian weekly 
holiday. Also, the Islamic lunar calendar was replaced by the 
Gregorian calendar. The discrimination of women in public life 
and public institutions was officially ended and the Sharia 
replaced by the Swiss Civil Code. The Islamic education system 
was abolished and public religious schools were closed, in order to 
facilitate the spread of  secular ideology.  
 
It should be borne in mind, that Turkey is the only Islamic 
country that has consistently imposed laicism, despite the various 
political fluctuations and tensions over the decades, both 
                                                          
16 According to the opinion polls made by International Republican Institute, 
USA, 86.5% of Turkish citizens trust the military forces more than any 
institutions including political power in Turkey. See Yalçın, Doğan, 2008: 
Hürriyet (10 June).  
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domestically and internationally. What Islamic countries can learn 
from the Turkish experience is the adaptation and implementation 
of secularism.  
 
Speaking on a popular Oprah-style talk show on Egypt's Dream 
TV, on his official visit to Egypt on 14th of September, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan had said:  
 
"Do not be wary of secularism. I hope there 
will be a secular state in Egypt." He added that 
secularism doesn't mean a lack of religion, but 
creating respect for all religions and religious 
freedoms for individuals…Secularism does not 
mean that people are secular. For example, I am 
not secular, but I am the prime minister of a 
secular state”.17  
 
Paradoxically, rapid capitalist development and anti-
secularism/conservatism/re-Islamisation have gone hand in hand 
in Turkey, during the last three decades. This appears to totally 
contradict Max Weber's assertion that the enlightenment, religious 
reformation and industrial revolution are closely related. In fact, 
reformation may be partly regarded as the reflection of deep-
seated economic changes, which accompanied the expansion of 
Europe, the dawn of capitalism and the end of feudalism. In other 
words, the reformation movement was influenced by economic 
factors. Meanwhile, however, it has also been argued, that it was 
the reformation which broke the position that the church had 
exercised over economic life. 18 
                                                          
17 Champion, Mark; Bradly, Matt ( 2011, September 15). Islamists Criticize 
Turkish Premier’s Secular Remarks. The Wall Street Journal. Available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119044917045765706702641161
78.html. The statement made by PM Erdogan has been heavily criticised by 
Muslim Brotherhood: see, same article “[…]It's not allowed for any non-
Egyptian to interfere in our constitution”, said Mahmoud Ghazlan, a spokesman 
for the Brotherhood, “if I was to advise the Turks I'd advise them to crop the 
secular article in their constitution, but I'm not allowed. It's not my right”.  
18 Cole, Clough, 1952: Economic History of Europe (Boston: Heath): 151-152. 
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Interestingly, the rapid economic development in Turkey since 
2002, though, together with the AKP, created a new conservative 
industrial class dubbed “Anatolian Tigers” with help from the state 
and rent economy. This may be referred to as Neo- Calvinism (or 
Islamic Calvinists) in an Islamic country.19 It has challenged the 
big capitalist and Western-oriented class located mainly in 
Istanbul.20 This new business class does not see any conflict in 
their economic activities with Islamic principles. They accepted 
the rules of the capitalist game and international economic order 
and have adjusted themselves to global economic conditions. On 
the one hand, the Turkish economy is almost integrated in the 
world market, but on the other hand, Turkish society has become 
more conservative and the practise of secularism has been slowly 
weakening since 1945.21  
 
The result indicates that the Turkish economy has become an 
integral part of the world economy, while conservatism has spread 
and the national identity has been replaced by an “Islamic” 
identity. The worst scenario may be a chaotic one, with Turkey 
moving from “secularism” via “moderate Islam”, to “a state ruled 
by Islamic principles”. In that case, a fundamental pillar of the 
secularist state would have collapsed. In the extreme case, Turkey 
could be fully anchored in the Middle East with all the features of 
an Islamic society. Turkey is widely presented as a role model 
depicting how capitalism and Islam can work together.  
 
                                                          
19 Max Weber regarded the Calvinism of the main sources of capitalist spirit, 
which made it possible to ‘worship God and Mammon at the same time’. See 
Cole, 1952, art.cit.: 153. 
20 Özel, Soli (2011, July 1). Democracy, Islam and the AKP. On Turkey. 
Analysis.German Marshall Fund (GMF). Available at: 
http://www.gmfus.org/turkey: 2. 
21 Secularism began to be rolled back and Islam began to play an important role 
in the political rivalry, because unstable governments with weak electoral bases 
were likely to embark upon populist policies in order to increase their chances of 
re-election at a low cost. For example, the Ministry of Education has allowed the 
"Koran Courses" to open outside the public schools and the pilgrimage to Mecca 
was permitted. For this reason even the scarce hard currencies were available for 
Hajji.    
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Some commentators also argue that Ankara has a hidden 
Islamic agenda aimed at distancing it from the West. Middle 
Eastern historian Bernard Lewis stresses that “… the AKP aims to 
establish “Islamic Democracy…”. 22 If such is true, how can it 
therefore be possible for an Islamic country like Turkey, which is 
itself threatened by the re-Islamisation process, to play a guiding 
role for authoritarian Islamic countries? 
 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
Based on past experiences, recent development in the MENA 
countries suggest that one authoritarian regime will follow another 
under different colours and political names, but like the previous 
one based on Islamic ideology and perhaps Arab nationalism. 
Besides one-sided and rigged elections, most Arab countries and 
Iran have never embraced democratic values such as freedom of 
speech, individual freedom and religious freedom continuously.    
 
It is obvious, that the country's necessary radical 
transformation process cannot be realised with the traditional 
policy instruments and practices. Also, it is clear that the degree of 
transformation will largely depend on the replacement of the 
politicians and civil servants, who served the previous regime by a 
more open-minded new generation. Those who desire the 
replacement of leadership in the political parties have, however, 
not yet demonstrated their willingness and ability to set in motion 
and resolutely affect tough, long-overdue processes of change.  
 
                                                          
22 Princeton historian Bernard Lewis argued in Wall Street Journal on 2 April 2011 
(interviewed by Bari Weiss) that “In Turkey, the movement is getting more and 
more toward re- Islamization. The government has that as its intention—and it 
has been taking over, very skillfully, one part after another of Turkish society: the 
economy, the business community, the academic community, and the media. And 
now they're taking over the judiciary, which in the past has been the stronghold 
of the republican regime”. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote that 
“Turkey’s Islamist government is seemingly focused not on joining the European 
Union but the Arab League” (June 15, 2010). 
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The MENA countries have a long way to go to restructure their 
social and economic life and to implement universal democratic 
values. Each country must decide on its own democratisation 
process. The reformation movement is painful and unforeseeable 
in its economic and political consequences. Another important 
question which should be asked is whether the MENA countries 
ought to take Turkey as a role model. If a model is needed, they 
can adopt the democratic values and institutions from the 
mainspring of civilisation, namely Europe which Turkey itself 
adopted as a model. 
 
At present, Turkey is regarded as an important middle-sized 
regional power in economic and political realms and Erdoğan’s 
popularity on Arab streets has increased strongly. His speech at 
the AKP headquarters on 12th of June, following his election 
victory, gives the impression that under his leadership Turkey will 
take an active role in all regional and international disputes as a 
mediator.23    
 
Undoubtedly, it will be a great disappointment for people in the 
Arab world, if Ankara turns out to be unable to fulfil such 
expectations. Turkey’s decision and policy makers are, therefore, 
well-advised not to be involved in the events directly. Instead, 
Turkey should carefully and conscientiously draw lessons from its 
past experiences with the MENA region. It is a historical fact that 
the friends, enemies and coalitions in this region can quickly 
change overnight. Nobody knows how the emotional and 
unpredictable crowds would behave, and on which side they will 
be tomorrow.   
 
With the Arab Spring, it has become clear that major and long 
term programmes of radical changes in the region can only be 
realised through international collaboration with the USA and the 
                                                          
23 See Ferguson, Niall (2011, June 19): Mideast’s next Dilemma, Newsweek. 
Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/turkey-the-
mideast-s-next-dilemma.html. 
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EU. Ankara should not put the future economic and political 
stability of the country at stake. 
  
Finally, we may predict the following:  
 
The economic integration process with the Community will 
help Turkey transform its economy and catch up with the EU. 
Besides the question of Turkey’s full membership, Turkey will be 
fully integrated into the European Single Market in the next 
decade. For the time being, Russia, Central Asia and the Islamic 
countries cannot provide serious alternatives to economic relations 
with the OECD and particularly with the Community. Only an 
economically strong country, which is fully integrated within the 
world’s most advanced economies, can have influence and play a 
leading role in the region. At this stage of economic development, 
the new markets in the region have a complementary character and 
will not be able to replace the industrialised countries anytime in 
the near future.  
 
The negotiation process for membership in the EU will help 
Turkey reduce its democratic deficits, through adopting and 
implementing European norms and standards. To achieve its 
proclaimed goal as a regional power, it is obvious that the need for 
political and economic change and its implementation made the 
initiation of radical reform measures in all fields of political and 
economic life inevitable. If Turkey is able to complete the whole 
process successfully, its political and economic role in the region 
could change markedly and could subsequently be regarded as a 
significant role model. Until then, the road to success is to long, 
challenging and the going is rough. 
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